{"id":2815,"date":"2018-05-22T22:07:35","date_gmt":"2018-05-22T22:07:35","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/www.ruleoflaw.ca\/?p=2815"},"modified":"2018-10-12T17:09:39","modified_gmt":"2018-10-12T17:09:39","slug":"a-conversation-on-comeau","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.ruleoflaw.ca\/a-conversation-on-comeau\/","title":{"rendered":"A Conversation on Comeau"},"content":{"rendered":"

This informal discussion between myself, Asher Honickman and Professor Malcolm Lavoie is owed, first of all, to a mea culpa<\/em>. It\u2019s a transcription of a discussion that was meant to be a podcast, but due to a recording issue wasn\u2019t captured correctly. Since Asher, Malcolm and I agreed the discussion was useful and worth preserving, we\u2019ve decided to present it in written format to ARL\u2019s readers.<\/p>\n

We cover both the broad, economic policy-related consequences of the Supreme Court\u2019s decision in R. v. Comeau<\/em><\/a>, 2018 SCC 15, as well as\u00a0 its intriguing dicta on stare decisis<\/em> and how the Bedford<\/em> principle has been explicitly restricted to cases of \u201cchanging social circumstances\u201d.\u00a0 I hope we\u2019ve captured something of the spirit of this lively discussion!<\/p>\n

— Joanna Baron, National Director, <\/strong>Runnymede Society<\/strong><\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n

* * *<\/p>\n

The SCC Decision<\/u><\/strong><\/p>\n

Joanna Baron [JB]: Let\u2019s start with the basic reaction that the everyday layperson would have had to this decision: what went wrong? This case garnered universal support as well as serious legal arguments and political momentum, well-argued position in favour of lessening interprovincial trade barriers, and yet we have this decision which almost universally disappoints. Malcolm, given your experience both as a former SCC clerk and as counsel in this case, what do you think went wrong here?<\/strong><\/em><\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n

Malcolm Lavoie [ML]: I think an important starting point for thinking about this case is to realize that it was, both from the SCC\u2019s perspective and the perspective of many people interested in the case, about much more than just beer. The facts of the case were relatively straightforward\u2014this absurd cross-border sting operation that sought to give tickets to people crossing the QC-NB border to purchase beer. But the trickier part of the case was that the provision in question, s. 121, is written in very general terms, it states simply that goods are to be \u201cadmitted free\u201d between the provinces.<\/p>\n

And the issue that I think the SCC got hung up on is the way in which this could diminish provincial regulatory authority\u2014their power to enact regulations in what the provinces viewed as the public interest that could have effects on interprovincial trade. So in this case, the prohibition on possession of all but small quantities of beer was part of a broader provincial scheme that provided for comprehensive regulation of liquor in New Brunswick. And there are lots of laws that similarly limit trade but are part of broader regulatory frameworks and I think the court was afraid of unduly limiting the right of provinces to enact these regulations.<\/p>\n

\u00a0<\/em><\/strong><\/p>\n

JB: Would you say that the court leaned too heavily on provincial jurisdiction under s. 92? Did the court effectively privilege one part of the constitution over another?<\/em><\/strong><\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n

ML: Yeah. I think that\u2019s a fair assessment. In fairness to the court, there was a genuine issue here of balancing government regulatory authority with this clearly stated provision in the constitution that goods are to be admitted freely from one province to the other. My criticism of the court\u2019s approach is that it adopted an approach so permissive that it effectively doesn\u2019t do very much. It doesn\u2019t do much, so far as I can tell, beyond what sections 91 and 92 already do. So the court holds that under s. 121, a province can\u2019t adopt measures whose primary purpose is to impede trade. Well, under ss. 91 and 92, provinces already can\u2019t do that. If the primary purpose of a regulation to impede interprovincial trade, then it relates in pith and substance to interprovincial trade, and is within exclusive federal jurisdiction.<\/p>\n

So the court had a legitimate concern about not unduly restricting provincial regulatory authority, but I believe it took that too far, to the point of practically nullifying s. 121. S. 121 doesn\u2019t have much work to do going forward under the Court\u2019s approach, and that\u2019s unfortunate.<\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n

JB: So what do you think they could have done instead that would have better reconciled the legitimate competing demands that arise from the structure of our constitution?<\/em><\/strong><\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n

ML: They could have adopted a test that would have demanded a little more in terms of justification from a provincial government where it enacts a measure that restricts trade. Under the court\u2019s approach, all a province has to do is make sure that there\u2019s some rational connection between a trade barrier and some broader scheme that\u2019s otherwise within provincial jurisdiction. The court could have asked for a little more. That\u2019s what I argued for in my academic article, and on behalf of Artisan Ales [an Alberta company that intervened in the case].<\/p>\n

What I asked the court to adopt was a test to the effect that if a province discriminates against out-of-province goods\u2014 if it enacts some sort of measure whereby out of province goods are treated differently from in-province goods \u2013 the province should be subject to a strict requirement of justification, namely the province has to establish that this approach is necessary to achieve an important policy objective. So in the case of Comeau<\/em>, rather than saying, \u201cYeah, we are banning all but small quantities of out-of-province liquor, and that\u2019s ok because it\u2019s rationally connected to a scheme of regulating the distribution and sale of liquor within the province\u201d, the province would have had to actually establish that this prohibition was necessary for some really significant objective, like health or safety. It would have had to demonstrate that no reasonable non-discriminatory means of achieving the same policy objective would have been possible.<\/p>\n

And that would have achieved real balance. It would have preserved provinces\u2019 ability to enact regulations that are genuinely necessary to achieve important objectives. At the same time though, it would have given effect to this constitutional guarantee in s. 121 of free interprovincial trade.<\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n

Comeau and Federalism<\/u><\/strong><\/p>\n

JB: Asher, I\u2019m curious to hear what you think. In general, in your writings for ARL, you have been a fan of a more robust federalism jurisprudence. So on its face, the court\u2019s carving out of a more robust provincial jurisdiction might appeal to you. What do you think about what Comeau had to say on this point?<\/em><\/strong><\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n

Asher Honickman [AH]: Well, I don\u2019t think this was the sort of federalism I would promote. The federalism I have promoted is more of the classical approach where each order of government has defined jurisdiction. Really, what we\u2019re seeing in the Comeau<\/em> case is a judicial statement that the property and civil rights power is extremely broad. And it\u2019s interesting because there wasn\u2019t really a division of powers argument put before the Court, but it\u2019s almost implicit in what the Court is saying that this law would also survive a division of powers analysis, notwithstanding it has a pretty significant interprovincial trade component. And so this is contrary to the federalism I\u2019ve always promoted. This is really saying that Parliament and the provinces can enact whatever barriers to interprovincial trade they want, it\u2019s all one big happy family, so long as these laws don\u2019t conflict with each other and we have to go to a paramountcy analysis.<\/p>\n

That is not what the Constitution says. In my commentary on Comeau<\/em>, what I\u2019ve said is that while s.121 is not this utterly transformative provision, I do think it\u2019s there to emphasize something very important, which is that the provinces do not have the right to regulate interprovincial trade. The property and civil rights power is very broad, but it does have limits.<\/p>\n

You see this throughout the entire drafting history of the BNA Act<\/em>\u2014the Framers were very worried about the property and civil rights power, because they knew it was broad. They put in textual guarantees against reading it too broadly, like the notwithstanding clause in s. 91. I would argue that s. 121 can be seen in the same light \u2013 it’s the framers limiting the scope of property and civil rights to exclude interprovincial trade.<\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n

JB: Malcolm already alluded to this, but if you look at s. 111 of the SCC\u2019s decision, where they talk about whether the test for s. 121 is engaged, it really does carve it out to almost a dead letter.<\/strong><\/em><\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n

AH: It does, and this is essentially an absurdity. To believe this you have to believe that the framers went ahead and drafted this provision\u2014I believe it was even amended between two drafts\u2014intending it to have no content whatsoever. Malcolm\u2019s correct that it\u2019s essentially nullified because it\u2019s superfluous in light of s. 91(2). I would argue it provides even less protection than s.91(2) provides.<\/p>\n

Under a s. 91(2) analysis, you don\u2019t have to establish that a provincial law\u2019s primary purpose is interprovincial trade, you do a much more holistic pith and substance analysis, which looks at purpose but also effects. As far as I recall, we don\u2019t have language in that test going to primary purpose, because laws can have multiple purposes. For example, if Ontario enacted a law tomorrow that said all businesses within the province have to close at 5pm, that law would have to be read down because it would apply to federal undertakings such as banks, and the provinces can\u2019t regulate banks. Even if the provinces said the primary purpose of the legislation was not to regulate banks, it wouldn\u2019t matter because the law would impact banks and so it\u2019s in relation to banking, therefore ultra vires and would need to be read down so as not to apply to banks. And so that\u2019s how an analysis like that would work.<\/p>\n

But here the Court is saying as long as the primary purpose isn\u2019t directed at trade, it\u2019s constitutional. And beyond that, as Malcolm was saying, there\u2019s the rational connection test where on a division of powers analysis\u2014you do sometimes have a rational connection test, but more frequently you have a necessarily incidental test. So not only is s. 121 rendered superfluous, it provides even less protection, so we\u2019re left to wonder why would the framers even have included s. 121? What purpose does it serve?<\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n

ML: Yeah, I just want to re-iterate that I think that\u2019s exactly right, that this not only reduces s. 121 to a 91\/92 federalism analysis, it reduces it to the most permissive form of federalism analysis, which leaves out the necessarily incidental approach and essentially allows anything in that has a rational connection to a broader scheme, which I suppose is consistent with a co-operative federalism approach, but is certainly highly permissive.<\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n

AH: I agree with that. The example I gave about banking, as I\u2019m thinking about it\u2014under a modern cooperative federalism approach, the court might actually have allowed that as constitutional, because that\u2019s how the jurisprudence has gone to an extent. But I think we\u2019d both agree that under a classical federalism approach, a law like that would have been read down and that\u2019s how the interjurisdictional immunity doctrine got started. You had provinces enacting laws that broadly fit into property and civil rights, but because they addressed federally regulated companies or entities, they had to be read down.<\/p>\n

And so you could have the same analysis, really, with the type of law in Comeau<\/em>, where you could say that nobody is implying that provinces can\u2019t establish monopolies on alcohol, but that doesn\u2019t mean that you\u2019re allowed to control where the alcohol comes from out of province<\/em>. So you could say that within NB you can only buy liquor from the New Brunswick Liquor Control Board, and that would be a classical division of powers approach to this. But under this banner of cooperative federalism, the courts have effectively said, let\u2019s just let both orders of government do what they want.<\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n

\u2018Admitted Free\u2019 and s. 121<\/u><\/strong><\/p>\n

\u00a0<\/em><\/strong>JB: I\u2019d like to ask both of you about probably the most commented on aspect of this case, the Court\u2019s interpretation of s. 121, and particularly their comment that, \u201cWe don\u2019t know why the drafters used the expression \u2018admitted free\u2019,\u00a0 but then they go on to reject what s. 121 says on its face and interpret it as something much more narrow. So what on earth is going on here?<\/em><\/strong><\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n

ML: So I think part of it does come from this need to read the provision in harmony with the rest of the Constitution, including the property and civil rights power granted to the provinces. The court also leans on the federalism principle, which is fine. The federalism principle is the abstract idea that the constitution grants a fair amount of power to the provinces, and we need to read the provision in a way that\u2019s consistent with that.<\/p>\n

So I think the Court got the balance wrong, but it was grappling with serious considerations and a real need to read constitutional provisions in harmony with one another. The court was reluctant to restrict governments\u2019 ability to regulate the economy.<\/p>\n

It gave with one hand, in saying that s. 121 applies to non-tariff trade barriers; a point that was somewhat ambiguous on the jurisprudence. But then it left the door wide open with its rational connection test and its primary purpose analysis. It said \u2018yes, there\u2019s this broadly worded provision which applies to all kinds of trade barriers, but it essentially won\u2019t have any effect, at least on provincial measures, as long as those measures are within provincial jurisdiction.\u201d So it ended up derogating from the broad phrasing of s. 121 and ultimately undermining what could have been an important structural limitation of the constitution.<\/p>\n

\u00a0<\/em><\/strong><\/p>\n

JB: Constitutional provisions are abstract creations of language, and this is where the thick walls of regulatory bias in Canada really show up, I think. Asher?<\/em><\/strong><\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n

AH: The court is so fond of talking about the realities of our society and how things change\u2014but the court has never been shy about sticking its neck out on social issues like prostitution, same-sex marriage, or safe injection sites. The court has always been willing to say, \u2018We are the guardians of the Constitution\u2019, whether based on a straight reading of the text or some sort of living tree doctrine. The Court has been bold. So it\u2019s a bit strange for the Court to suddenly get cold feet about interfering with governments and what they want to do.<\/p>\n

And deference is a fine principle, but you can\u2019t abandon it so freely in the social realm and then apply it so religiously in the economic realm. It\u2019s the kind of thing that you either apply or you don\u2019t.<\/p>\n

And the same thing has happened with stare decisis<\/em>, where in Bedford<\/em> <\/a>you have this very lax rule, and here the Court is saying we have to be very careful about overturning a past precedent. And that\u2019s a fine thing to say, but it\u2019s inconsistent with recent jurisprudence.<\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n

Vertical Stare Decisis<\/em><\/u><\/strong><\/p>\n

\u00a0<\/em><\/strong>JB: Let\u2019s turn to stare decisis. One of the most interesting questions we were waiting to have resolved in <\/em><\/strong>Comeau was how the <\/em>Bedford principle\u2014that a judge can overrule vertically binding stare decisis– would apply to historical interpretation of a statute. The court said there is a categorical difference between a trial judge taking notice of changing social conditions and overruling binding principle, and merely having a new historical interpretation of a statute.<\/em><\/strong><\/p>\n

Isn\u2019t there some basis in the suggestion that changing social conditions are by definition impossible for a judge to anticipate, whereas the history of the principles which inspired the drafters of the Constitution were equally available to the judges in Gold Seal?<\/em><\/strong><\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n

AH: \u00a0I do think there\u2019s an attempt to put the genie back in the bottle, and I want to say there\u2019s very good language in this case on stare decisis<\/em> generally that will be great to cite in future decisions. Whoever wrote this decision must have had a mind to laying down good foundational principles. There\u2019s great language on how important stare decisis<\/em> is. So all of that is great, but there\u2019s two problems on the stare decisis<\/em> front.<\/p>\n

One is this new stare decisis<\/em> test from Bedford<\/em>. I see what you\u2019re saying that courts can\u2019t anticipate changing social conditions. But we have to take a step back for a second.\u00a0 Before Bedford<\/em>, overruling vertical stare decisis<\/em> was almost not a thing at all, and overruling horizontal stare decisis<\/em> typically required that the decision had been decided incorrectly.<\/p>\n

And that\u2019s really what was at issue in Comeau<\/em>. There were a number of things that the historian who testified in Comeau<\/em> probably shouldn\u2019t have been allowed to testify to, and that shouldn\u2019t have been admissible as going to the ultimate issue, but in terms of the evidence of what was going on in 1864-67, and what people wanted, all of that goes to the correct interpretation of s. 121. And so on a horizontal stare decisis analysis, traditionally that would be a major consideration for the Court. The Court ought to have considered that if the court in Gold Seal<\/em> had this evidence at the time, they would have seen that s. 121 actually provides more than just protection from tariff barriers, ergo Gold Seal<\/em> is an incorrect decision.<\/p>\n

Now, traditionally, changing social circumstances isn\u2019t even a consideration on a horizontal<\/em> analysis. You can tie it to the living tree doctrine, I suppose. But if you go through the history of living tree cases, I can\u2019t think of even one case where the court has expressly used the living tree doctrine to overturn one of its own past precedents. So that idea that you can use the living tree doctrine to overturn past precedent is still somewhat controversial, whereas overturning your own precedent because it was decided incorrectly is well established.<\/p>\n

So, if the court is willing to say that you can use the living tree doctrine to overturn vertical stare decisis<\/em>, you should definitely be able to overturn vertical stare decisis<\/em> based on correctness as well. It\u2019s extremely arbitrary, and it just makes no sense to my mind.<\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n

ML: I\u2019m sympathetic to what Asher said and what he\u2019s written on this, I will say this is probably the first of many unintended consequences of Bedford<\/em> that the Court is going to have to deal with. From what I can tell, what the trial judge did here in accepting new historical evidence wasn\u2019t overtly at odds with what the Court said in Bedford<\/em> and Carter<\/em>, but it probably was at odds with what the Court meant. It seems like what the Court wanted to do in Bedford<\/em> and Carter<\/em> was to create greater flexibility for trial courts to use the Charter as an open-ended tool for social change, and that\u2019s where the special emphasis on evidence going to social facts comes in, and where evidence relating to the history of the enactment of the constitutional provision doesn\u2019t have the same resonance. And so this is where I will say, and this goes along with what Asher said, that it does seem like the Court is less concerned with allowing trial judges to get decisions right and more concerned with enabling judicial policy-making discretion, especially with regards to the Charter, and not so much with respect to the economic provisions of the Constitution.<\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n

AH: It goes back to what I was saying earlier. It\u2019s as if we\u2019re getting two kinds of Constitutions here, and it\u2019s similar to the contrast between Charter<\/em> decisions and division of powers decisions. In division of powers decisions the Court talks about facilitating what governments want to do. Can you imagine if courts used this language in the Charter<\/em> realm? In the Charter<\/em> decisions, the Court always talks about being the Guardians of the Constitution. They don\u2019t talk about it that much in the division of powers realm.<\/p>\n

And so too in the Charter realm, there\u2019s going to be a more lax stare decisis<\/em> analysis, whereas in the economic realm, there\u2019s a much more rigorous application of stare decisis<\/em>.<\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n

JB: Yes, it\u2019s like there\u2019s a good constitution and a bad constitution. The good constitution is the Charter<\/em>\u2014the Court is so generous in imposing social programs, and dictating governmental actions. But then it\u2019s very stingy when it comes to provisions like s. 121.<\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n

Implications for Trans Mountain pipeline<\/u><\/strong><\/p>\n

\u00a0<\/strong>JB: So a lot have wondered how the Trans Mountain dispute might be affected by this decision. Some have speculated that provinces may feel emboldened by this decision, but others have said that Comeau ought to make clear that provinces can\u2019t rely on their own jurisdiction to enact barriers to clearly interprovincial projects like a pipeline.<\/strong><\/em><\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n

ML: The decision reinforces what we already know about ss. 91 and 92\u2014we already knew, without reference to s. 121, that provinces couldn\u2019t pass legislation whose primary purpose was to create an interprovincial trade barrier. To the extent that either BC or Alberta\u2019s legislation is primarily about creating an interprovincial trade barrier, it will be struck down. This does re-iterate that provinces can\u2019t intentionally create trade barriers. On the other hand, I think what the Trans Mountain disputes and other trade disputes in Canadian history have shown is the uncertainty of a test that\u2019s all about the pith and substance of legislation and whether a measure is sufficiently connected to a broader legislative scheme.<\/p>\n

BC and Alberta probably have a sense that what they\u2019re proposing to do might be unconstitutional, but under the cooperative federalism approach, they figure they might as well give it a try and see if they can use it for leverage. There\u2019s so much uncertainty in construing the purpose of a measure that they might just get away with it, and at very least will have a plausible argument that they can do it.<\/p>\n

And that all points to the need for a robust interpretation of a provision like 121, one that says even if creating a discriminatory trade barrier isn\u2019t the primary purpose of an enactment, even if a province takes care to hide a trade barrier within a broader legislative scheme, it can still be a problem if it\u2019s not properly justified. So I think there was a missed opportunity here for the Court to lay down a doctrine that would have created greater certainty around interprovincial trade barriers and put a stop to the escalating internal trade wars that happen in Canada, which are somewhat embarrassing.<\/p>\n

On the one hand, yes, there\u2019s some language in the case that would allow you to call into question what these provincial governments are doing, but on the other hand the Court could have done a lot more to create clarity around trade barriers and particularly around the fact that provinces shouldn\u2019t be allowed to set them up except when they\u2019re truly necessary.<\/p>\n

\u00a0<\/em><\/strong><\/p>\n

JB: BC conceivably could set up a regulatory scheme that would block the pipeline and connect it to health and safety provincial objectives. Given the low hurdle of rational connection, I think it would be quite easy for them.<\/em><\/strong><\/p>\n

ML: You might be right. It\u2019s possible that the federal government could try and rely on extrinsic evidence and say the real purpose of the enactment is to block a pipeline, and that might be what the outcome turns out, but certainly there\u2019s some cover for British Columbia, if it does couch its measures in a broader scheme that concerns environmental protection.<\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n

AH: I think, with the pipeline issue, it\u2019s much more likely, from a practical point of view, that the Court would find BC\u2019s actions to be problematic. In the pipeline case, the Province of BC is essentially trying to frustrate a regulatory scheme from coming into place, whereas Comeau<\/em> was about allowing provinces to act as they wish. I would not be surprised if the language from Comeau<\/em> gets read a little more broadly, where the Court says that “primary purpose” really just meant “dominant purpose” and finds the BC law unconstitutional.<\/p>\n

And of course, if the federal government steps in, you get the issue of paramountcy, where there\u2019s no doubt they can act under the trade and commerce power, the declaratory power, as well as potentially under the peace, order and good government power. The federal government has ample footing to act, and to the extent its law comes into conflict with B.C.\u2019s law, the doctrine is clear that any federal law would prevail.<\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n

ML: I think that\u2019s quite right, even if the BC law is a valid enactment it could be inapplicable if it frustrates federal law, and s. 121 doesn\u2019t really have anything to do with that.<\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n

JB: Any silver linings?<\/em><\/strong><\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n

ML: One of the themes that emerged from the Court at the hearing was that free trade might be good policy, but if you want good policy enacted you should go take it up with politicians, with Parliament or your provincial legislature. The court\u2019s role is to interpret the structure of the Constitution, rather than to enact good policy. And that\u2019s fair. But one thing I think the court missed is that there is a structural element to the question of free internal trade. Lots of governments in Canada talk a good game on free trade, but there\u2019s a structural problem, what you would call in game theory a collective action problem.<\/p>\n

You have 14 governments that all have to come to some sort of agreement. And they might all think free trade is good in general terms, but they might also like to pursue specific agendas that advantage their own residents at the expense of other Canadians. Each government has an incentive to defect from what would be an optimal situation for everyone. That\u2019s why when governments sit down to discuss internal free trade agreements, you end up with these long lists of protectionist exceptions, policies that are exempted from free trade requirements.<\/p>\n

And that\u2019s why it makes sense in structural terms to tie the hands of governments through a constitutional commitment to free trade, which we have in s. 121, so they won\u2019t be tempted to defect from the free trade guarantee and enact protectionist policies that advantage specific interest groups. So from my perspective, this is a structural issue, not just a question of good policy or bad policy.<\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

This informal discussion between myself, Asher Honickman and Professor Malcolm Lavoie is owed, first of all, to a mea culpa. It\u2019s a transcription of a discussion that was meant to be a podcast, but due to a recording issue wasn\u2019t captured correctly. Since Asher, Malcolm and I agreed the discussion was useful and worth preserving, …<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1254,"featured_media":2820,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"_exactmetrics_skip_tracking":false,"_exactmetrics_sitenote_active":false,"_exactmetrics_sitenote_note":"","_exactmetrics_sitenote_category":0,"_monsterinsights_skip_tracking":false,"_monsterinsights_sitenote_active":false,"_monsterinsights_sitenote_note":"","_monsterinsights_sitenote_category":0,"footnotes":""},"categories":[77,36],"tags":[458,260,203,255,158,129,128,300,457],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.ruleoflaw.ca\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/2815"}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.ruleoflaw.ca\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.ruleoflaw.ca\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.ruleoflaw.ca\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1254"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.ruleoflaw.ca\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=2815"}],"version-history":[{"count":7,"href":"https:\/\/www.ruleoflaw.ca\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/2815\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":2824,"href":"https:\/\/www.ruleoflaw.ca\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/2815\/revisions\/2824"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.ruleoflaw.ca\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/2820"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.ruleoflaw.ca\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=2815"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.ruleoflaw.ca\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=2815"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.ruleoflaw.ca\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=2815"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}