On October 23, alongside my colleagues Konstantia Koutouki of University of Montreal, as well as Safie Diallo and Alexandra Lorange, I partook in a discussion initiated by the McGill Runnymede Society, on the criticism of cultural appropriation in the arts and literature.<\/p>\n
In preparation for this discussion, I discovered more problems with the notion of cultural appropriation than time would allow me. So, I\u2019ve decided to publish a series of posts on the topic.<\/p>\n
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An unruly polysemy rather than a concept<\/strong><\/p>\n \u201cCultural Appropriation\u201d as defined by Oxford Reference<\/a> is \u201ca term used to describe the taking over of creative or artistic forms, themes, or practices by one cultural group from another.\u201d It is in general used to describe Western appropriations of non\u2010Western or non\u2010white forms, and carries connotations of exploitation and dominance. The concept has come into literary and visual art criticism by analogy with the acquisition of artifacts (the Elgin marbles, Benin bronzes, Lakota war shirts, etc.) by Western museums.\u201d Yet, an analogy is generally best taken with a grain of salt. To start with, let\u2019s situate the case of appropriated artifacts among the following six:<\/p>\n If an analogy with the first use of the term \u201ccultural appropriation\u201d can contribute in giving meaning to the second and third, it is misleading to couple the first with any of the last three or a combination thereof, since nothing in these latter cases is \u201cappropriated.\u201d Cultural appropriation as a blanket criticism \u2013which, of course, will always feel free to dismiss the law, along with \u201cWestern\u201d science or reason, as an instrument of \u201ccolonial domination\u201d\u2013 often decries the injustice of \u201cappropriation\u201d despite the absence of an art work that attracts copyright protection, while simultaneously seeking to\u00a0expropriate <\/em>the copyrighted work of the\u00a0 individual artist, or at the very least impose a sort of\u00a0 \u201ctax\u201d upon the artist for using the allegedly appropriated work.\u00a0 In the last three instances, there can be no question of \u201cappropriation\u201d except metaphorically, in an aesthetic sense. I have to insist that specifying this does not amount to supporting the argument that art is absolutely isolated from its \u201csocial context.\u201d<\/p>\n <\/p>\n When censorship is concealed as \u201ccritique\u201d <\/strong><\/p>\n In the sense that concerns us here, the term \u201ccensorship\u201d is not a legal one. It goes without saying that any criticism of censorship is not to be taken here as a legal opinion of illegality or unconstitutionality on my part. That said, I would like to highlight that even though case law does not seem to live up to the text, the Quebec Charter of Human Rights and Freedoms<\/a><\/em>, whose protection extends to freedom of expression, applies not only to public law relations, but also to private law ones in areas within the province\u2019s jurisdiction. I would also point out that in addition to the general law of contracts, certain private foreign laws, such as France\u2019s consumer law, have proved apt in providing some protection against private censorship, including that attributed to Facebook. In terms of freedom of artistic creation and dissemination, French public law has, since 2016, severely prohibited some form of private censorship. Indeed, paragraph two of Article 431-1<\/a> of France\u2019s Code p\u00e9nal<\/em> stipulates that \u201cthe act of hindering, in a concerted manner and by use of threat, the exercise of the freedom of artistic creation or the freedom of dissemination of artistic creation is punishable by imprisonment for a term of one year and a fine of 15,000 euros\u201d.<\/p>\n It is characteristic of the new, trendy modes of censorship not to identify themselves as such. The proponents of this censorship say something like \u201cIt never was a question of censorship! Rejecting funding applications isn\u2019t censorship! Censorship comes from the state! You just don\u2019t get it, it\u2019s the opposite of censorship, since it\u2019s a matter of civil society\u2019s exercising its freedom of expression! It\u2019s nothing more than a call for artistic and literary responsibility! Censorship has nothing to do with it, what we\u2019re talking about is a struggle for the transformation of social relations! Be woke!\u201d On this account, everything is explained for all people.<\/p>\n There is also a clear distinction to be drawn between a genuine critique of an artistic work that has been created, disseminated, and then seen or read,\u00a0 and calling for a preemptive, a priori<\/em> rejection of categories of art works on the basis that they amount to a sort of moral transgression, such as\u00a0 \u201ccultural appropriation,\u201d or \u201cunrepresentative\u201d casting.<\/p>\n A more specific example concerns artistic or literary treatment of rape without explicit moral condemnation, represented in Vanessa Courville\u2019s resignation letter as director of the Revue XYZ<\/em>, which she had released publicly before withdrawing it. The letter asserted that a literary text that depicts a rape scene without explicit moral condemnation amounts to a justification of, or contribution to, \u201crape culture,\u201d which \u201cis not covered by freedom of expression,\u201d a principle that, \u201cwithout responsible writing, is insignificant.\u201d \u00a0So, literary texts representing rape without explicit moral condemnation should \u201cno longer be received by committees as original works.\u201d According to its author, this call to publishers, of course, \u201cnever was a question of censorship<\/a>\u201d.<\/p>\n\n