{"id":3166,"date":"2019-05-28T17:08:21","date_gmt":"2019-05-28T17:08:21","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/www.ruleoflaw.ca\/?p=3166"},"modified":"2019-05-28T17:08:52","modified_gmt":"2019-05-28T17:08:52","slug":"the-political-consequences-of-deference-are-not-always-the-same","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.ruleoflaw.ca\/the-political-consequences-of-deference-are-not-always-the-same\/","title":{"rendered":"The Political Consequences of Deference are not Always the Same"},"content":{"rendered":"\n

In\nmy last post on this blog, I commented and mostly praised two recent blog posts\nat Double Aspect<\/a> by\nMark Mancini from earlier this month calling for less deference to\nadministrators in judicial review, unless a statute explicitly calls for such\ndeference. But after I began drafting my response, a new development arose that\nnow calls for a brief addendum.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Earlier\nthis month, the Supreme Court released its decision in Canada (Minister of Public Safety and Emergency\nPreparedness) v Chhina<\/em><\/a>. The decision made headlines for\nholding that detained migrants could bring an application seeking the writ of habeas corpus<\/em>. I am insufficiently\nexpert to have a strong opinion on the detention regime and the availability of\nhabeas corpus<\/em>, though I did find\nJustice Karakatsanis\u2019s majority opinion compelling. Subject matter experts,\nsuch as Jamie Chai Yun Lieuw, also seem to be applauding the decision.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

What\ncould have flown under the radar on first impression is Justice Abella\u2019s\ndissent, asserting that immigration officials should have their powers\ninterpreted broadly so as to render immaterial the inability to resort to the\ncourts and obtain the great writ. Implicit in her decision was a belief in the\npotential of administrative actors such as the immigration officials to\nfacilitate justice. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

Even\nin this case that did not concern the standard of review per se<\/em>, we see Justice Abella again expressing faith in the\nadministrative state to facilitate justice. Though often referred to as a\n\u201cprogressive\u201d jurist (a label I wish we would reserve for the realm of\npolitics), her macro-level concern to not constrain administrative action\nnonetheless shines through. This occurred even in a case where the courts\ndeclining jurisdiction was arguably an impediment to a \u201cprogressive\u201d result and\neven in the face of evidence that the administrative state was not <\/em><\/strong>dispensing\nthe type of justice that one might have hoped.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

I\nadd this brief addendum to my earlier post to attempt to emphasize, yet again,\nthat standard of review and the fundamental role of the courts in judicial\nreview should not be construed as a left-right political issue. I suspect many\n\u201cProgressives\u201d from the era of W.P.M. Kennedy (no relation) would be surprised,\nto say the least, that their successors are arguing for deference to\nimmigration officials revoking citizenship or prison wardens assigning\nindividuals to solitary confinement. While the opposite may occur in labour\nlaw, we should ask ourselves whether departing from traditional principles of\nstatutory interpretation is justified in any individual case. And if a\nparticular statute indeed calls for deference, principles of statutory\ninterpretation can generally respect that.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

One\ncould of course argue that deference should be granted to all administrators\nfor reasons such as efficiency, expertise, and independence. This is a genuine\npolicy view to hold (though Mark Mancini convincingly casts doubt on whether\nthe empirical assumptions underlying such viewpoints are actually true). But\none should be careful what one wishes for regarding the consequences of such a\nview.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Now,\nit\u2019s time to wait for the trilogy\u2026<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

In my last post on this blog, I commented and mostly praised two recent blog posts at Double Aspect by Mark Mancini from earlier this month calling for less deference to administrators in judicial review, unless a statute explicitly calls for such deference. But after I began drafting my response, a new development arose that …<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":133,"featured_media":2379,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"_exactmetrics_skip_tracking":false,"_exactmetrics_sitenote_active":false,"_exactmetrics_sitenote_note":"","_exactmetrics_sitenote_category":0,"_monsterinsights_skip_tracking":false,"_monsterinsights_sitenote_active":false,"_monsterinsights_sitenote_note":"","_monsterinsights_sitenote_category":0,"footnotes":""},"categories":[35,34],"tags":[264,265,140,266,512,273],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.ruleoflaw.ca\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/3166"}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.ruleoflaw.ca\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.ruleoflaw.ca\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.ruleoflaw.ca\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/133"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.ruleoflaw.ca\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=3166"}],"version-history":[{"count":1,"href":"https:\/\/www.ruleoflaw.ca\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/3166\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":3167,"href":"https:\/\/www.ruleoflaw.ca\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/3166\/revisions\/3167"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.ruleoflaw.ca\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/2379"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.ruleoflaw.ca\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=3166"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.ruleoflaw.ca\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=3166"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.ruleoflaw.ca\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=3166"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}