{"id":3336,"date":"2020-03-05T15:43:05","date_gmt":"2020-03-05T15:43:05","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/www.ruleoflaw.ca\/?p=3336"},"modified":"2020-03-05T15:43:07","modified_gmt":"2020-03-05T15:43:07","slug":"nothing-to-declare-part-ii","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.ruleoflaw.ca\/nothing-to-declare-part-ii\/","title":{"rendered":"Nothing to Declare: Part II"},"content":{"rendered":"\n

This\u00a0is\u00a0the\u00a0second\u00a0of\u00a0a\u00a0two-part\u00a0essay\u00a0written\u00a0by\u00a0Professor\u00a0<\/em>Maxime St-Hilaire and Xavier Foccroulle M\u00e9nard. Part I can be read here<\/a>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Assessment of the Fourth Argument on British, Australian and New Zealand Law<\/h4>\n\n\n\n

While not convincing, we find the comparative argument to have more\nweight, and this despite the following clarification. Gr\u00e9goire Webber, Eric\nMendelshon and Robert Leckey give two examples taken from Australian law: that\nof the Human Rights Act 2004<\/em> of the Australian Capital Territory and\nthat of the Charter of Human Rights and Responsibilities 2006<\/em> of the federated\nunit of Victoria. Section 32 of the former authorizes courts only to make \u201cdeclarations\nof incompatibility,\u201d while section 36 of the latter provides for \u201cdeclarations\nof inconsistency\u201d in a functionally equivalent manner. Nevertheless, as L\u00e9onid\nSirota pointed out in his otherwise concurring opinion piece, in the Momcilovic<\/em>[1]<\/a> case involving the charter of the state of\nVictoria, the High Court of Australia held that the making of mere declarations\nof inconsistency was not the exercise of a judicial function, and that the law\ncould not therefore constitutionally authorize the courts to make them. This\nleaves us with the British and New Zealand examples.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Section 4 of the British Human Rights Act 1998<\/em> in fact only\nallows the courts to make a \u201cdeclaration of incompatibility,\u201d which \u201cdoes not\naffect the validity, continuing operation or enforcement of the provision in\nrespect of which it is given.\u201d As for the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act\n1990<\/em>, it merely provides at section 4 that the courts may not, under its\nterms, declare any legislative act (\u201cenactment\u201d) \u201cimpliedly repealed or\nrevoked, or to be in any way invalid or ineffective,\u201d or decline to apply any\nprovision thereof. So, the Bill of Rights<\/em> did not expressly contemplate\nthat courts may make a declaration of inconsistency. It was by a slim\nthree-to-two majority that in 2018, in the Taylor<\/em> case, the Supreme\nCourt of New Zealand upheld such a power.[2]<\/a>\nDoes the fact that British and New Zealand courts – by express statutory\nauthority, constructed statutory authority or somehow their own authority – may\nmake declarations of mere inconsistency of particular statutory provisions with\nhuman rights legislation support the view that Canadian courts may make such\ndeclarations, where the declared \u201cinconsistency\u201d is that of statutory\nprovisions with constitutional provisions from which they validly derogate,\nunder a power expressly provided for in the supreme law itself? No. These\nforeign examples have nothing to do with section 33 of the Canadian Charter\nof Rights and Freedoms<\/em>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Neither New Zealand nor the United Kingdom has a supreme written law, in\nthe sense of formally constitutional, supra-legislative provisions. Their\nconstitutional law, despite the wishes of some authors,[3]<\/a> remains governed by the principle of\nparliamentary sovereignty, as opposed to constitutionalism, in the formal, supra-legislative\nsense of the term. In the case of Australia, the latter principle applies\nbecause it is a federation, yet the protection of fundamental rights is\nessentially excluded from it.[4]<\/a> This already explains why no human rights law\nadopted by the legislature or, in the case of the Australian federation, by one\nof its legislative authorities, can condition the validity<\/em> of other\nlegislative provisions.[5]<\/a> However, the attachment of these legislators\nto parliamentary sovereignty, at least in matters of fundamental rights, has\nconvinced them to go so far as to rule out the possibility that their\nlegislation on the latter subject might, in the event of a conflict of laws,\nrender other legislative provisions inoperative<\/em>. This is precisely how\nthe possibility for courts in these countries to declare the mere inconsistency<\/em>\nof given legislative provisions with their human rights legislation was either\nprovided for by their human rights legislation or recognized by these courts\nthemselves: as a means of ensuring that rights recognized in the legislation do\nnot remain absolutely without a remedy against … the legislation. This is\nclear from the reasoning of the New Zealand Supreme Court decision in Taylor<\/em>.[6]<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n

The legal framework of this judicial practice cannot be compared with\nthat of a Canadian court which would be asked to make a declaration on the\nrelationship of statutory provisions to provisions of the supreme law from\nwhich they validly derogate, with express authorization. As L\u00e9onid Sirota\nhimself insists, the legal framework and arguments for the protection of rights\nin countries that do not have what Jeremy Waldron calls \u201cstrong judicial review\nof legislation\u201d [7]<\/a> are not immediately transposable to the\ninterpretation of Canadian constitutional human rights law, beginning with\nsection 33 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms<\/em>.[8]<\/a> Section\n33 of the Canadian Charter <\/em>does not pertain to the law of remedies.  Its use<\/em> is only subject to formal<\/em>\njudicial review, but the result<\/em> thereof is a temporary change in substantive<\/em>\nlaw: the bracketing of Canadian<\/em> Charter<\/em> provisions that guarantee\nrights. Section 33 of the Canadian Charter is an attributive provision that\ngives Parliament and legislatures the power to temporarily exempt their\nprovisions from judicial review based on certain substantive provisions of the Charter<\/em>.\nIn other words, with respect to legislative provisions that validly make exception\nof it by derogating form the Canadian<\/em> Charter<\/em> provisions which\nguarantee it, a constitutional right is temporarily non-existent\u2014as the Ford<\/em>\ndecision indicated in distinguishing between derogation and limitation[9]<\/a>\u2014so that, on this particular issue of the\nrelationship between that right and the provisions that are excepted from it,\nthe courts have nothing to declare. Again, can one imagine for a moment New\nZealand courts taking the liberty of declaring particular statutory provisions\nto be inconsistent with provisions of the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990<\/em>\nwhen the former enactment would expressly provide that those provisions\nderogate from those rights? We do not think so.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The origins of judicial declarations are found, not in the common law,\nbut in the continental \u201ccivilist\u201d tradition.[10]<\/a>\nThis transplant required some adaptation. While the Anglo-American legal\ntradition holds that there is no right without a remedy (ubi jus ibi\nremedium<\/em>),[11]<\/a> it is also because it holds that there is no\nremedy without a corresponding right (or legal \u201cinterest\u201d). This seems to be\nincreasingly overlooked. Judges were initially reluctant to make declarations which\ndid not seem to them to constitute genuine remedies.[12]<\/a> The usefulness of such a remedy has come to be\nexplained in large part by the principle that there can be no enforcement of\njudgments against the Crown.[13]<\/a> The American scholar Edwin Borchard, who\nremains the most ardent and historically important advocate of the introduction\nof judicial declarations in common law countries, justified their importation\nby their ability to serve \u201ca useful purpose in clarifying and settling the\nlegal relations at issue.\u201d[14]<\/a> Today, some academics are calling on Canadian\ncourts to issue declarations that are not only further deprived of effect, but\ndevoid of a substantive object in the (be it temporary) absence of a legally existing\n(valid and in force) right. Of course, in Canada, the ability to make declarations\non the law in force is part of the constitutionally protected power of those higher\ncourts of review which are the superior courts. My argument does not directly fall\nwithin the realm of the law of procedure and remedies, just as section 33 of the\nCanadian<\/em> Charter<\/em> does not either.[15]<\/a> Rather, it goes to the more fundamental idea\nthat\u2014save the (unfortunate) self-indulgence of appellate courts giving their\nopinion on constitutional conventions in a reference procedure where they are\nasked by the government[16]<\/a>\u2014our\ncourts have no jurisdiction to decide matters other than of law that is existing,\npositive, and in force, and therefore have no jurisdiction to decide matters,\nbe they substantial or procedural, that are legally hypothetical or otherwise virtual.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

In Canadian law, it is only when a right has not been excepted from that\nit may constitute the basis for an application for a judicial declaration,\nwhich will be of invalidity \u2013 in the case of a Canadian Charter <\/em>right\nwhich has not been derogated from under section 33 \u2013 or inoperability \u2013 in the\ncase of a right protected by one of the (federal or provincial) \u201cquasi-constitutional\u201d\nhuman rights statutes but which is expressly set aside in the valid exercise of\nfederally allocated legislative powers.[17]<\/a> With less rigour, Canadian courts are also open\nto declaring that rights have been violated[18]<\/a> or that the state has failed to meet its\nobligations.[19]<\/a> When, on the contrary, a right has been\nvalidly excepted from, there is nothing to declare<\/em> by the courts about\nthe relationship between the valid exception provisions and the constitutional\nor quasi-constitutional provisions from which they are excepted. There can\ntherefore be neither a violation of rights nor a breach of obligation to be\ndecided upon, not even in the form of a simple declaration.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

In 2018, the Supreme Court of Canada summarized\nthe conditions under which a judicial declaration can be made in its Ewert<\/em>\ndecision:<\/p>\n\n\n\n

A declaration is a narrow remedy but one that is available\nwithout a cause of action and whether or not any consequential relief is\navailable: Manitoba Metis Federation Inc. v. Canada (Attorney General)<\/em>, 2013 SCC 14, [2013] 1 S.C.R. 623, at\npara. 143; P. W. Hogg, P. J. Monahan\nand W. K. Wright, Liability of the Crown<\/em> (4th ed. 2011), at p.\n37; L. Sarna, The Law of Declaratory Judgments<\/em> (4th ed. 2016),\nat p. 88; see also Federal Courts Rules<\/em>, SOR\/98-106, r. 64. A court may, in its\ndiscretion, grant a declaration where it has jurisdiction to hear the issue, where\nthe dispute before the court is real and not theoretical, where the party\nraising the issue has a genuine interest in its resolution, and where the\nrespondent has an interest in opposing the declaration sought: see Daniels\nv. Canada (Indian Affairs and Northern Development)<\/em>, 2016 SCC 12, [2016] 1 S.C.R. 99, at\npara. 11; Canada (Prime\nMinister) v. Khadr<\/em>, 2010 SCC 3, [2010]\n1 S.C.R. 44, at para. 46; Solosky\nv. The Queen<\/em>, 1979 CanLII 9 (SCC), [1980]\n1 S.C.R. 821, at pp. 830-33.[20]<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n

Our argument is quite simply that the courts have no jurisdiction to\nrule on the relationship between two legal norms, one of which, in this case a\nconstitutional right, has been validly excepted from with respect to the other\nby virtue of an authorization expressly provided for in the supreme law. Such\nquestion is, indeed,\ntheoretical.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

At this stage of the argument, we expect to be\nobjected the practice by which our courts would sometimes render declarations\nwith regard to \u201cfuture infringement of rights.\u201d Our response is two-fold.\nFirst, in all honesty, the argument we are discussing was not framed this way.\nSecond, had it been, then would it be reasonable to think that the courts do\nhave jurisdiction to rule on the consistency of particular legislative\nprovisions with the Canadian<\/em> Charter<\/em> provisions from which they are\nvalidly excepted, in anticipation that, about five years from now, such exception\nmay not be renewed under section 33(4)? We do not think so. Perhaps the imminent\nexpiration of such an exception would make a difference, but we doubt it very\nmuch. Furthermore, the question gives us an opportunity to elaborate a little\nmore on the applicable case law. Above all, one should not misunderstand it by\nfailing to distinguish between facts and legal norms. More specifically in our\ncase, it is crucial to differentiate, on the one hand, the factual conditions\nfor the violation of a right that have not yet been fulfilled while the right does\nexist legally and, on the other hand, a right that does not yet have legal existence,\nbe it \u201cagain,\u201d for it has been suspended with regard to the legal norm against\nwhich one would like to oppose it. This is precisely how the fact that the\nSupreme Court has actually never said that a declaratory judgment could be\ngiven on a future or past violation of rights is to be understood. The relevant\nexcerpt from the 1980 Solosky<\/em> decision is as follows:<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The first factor is directed to the \u201creality of the dispute\u201d.\nIt is clear that a declaration will not normally be granted when the dispute is\nover and has become academic, or where the dispute has yet to arise and may not\narise. As Hudson stresses, however, one must distinguish, on the one hand,\nbetween a declaration that concerns \u201cfuture\u201d rights and \u201chypothetical\u201d rights,\nand, on the other hand, a declaration that may be “immediately\navailable” when it determines the rights of the parties at the time of the\ndecision together with the necessary implications and consequences of these\nrights, known as future rights. (p. 710)[21]<\/a>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

This statement was in no way contradicted by the Operation Dismantle<\/em>\ndecision in 1985, in which an uncontradicted majority confirmed that \u201c[i]t is\nclearly illustrated by the rules governing declaratory and injunctive relief\nthat the courts will not take remedial action where the occurrence of future\nharm is not probable.\u201d[22]<\/a> In other words, it was the future possible facts\nthat were at issue, not the future existence of rights.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Assessment of the Fifth Argument on Section 24 not Being Listed in Section 33 of the Charter<\/em><\/h4>\n\n\n\n

Now remains the argument of section 24 of the Canadian Charter<\/em>,\nwhich should not keep us busy for much longer. As I have explained about its\nrelationship to section 28,[23]<\/a> section 33 allows rights to be excepted from through\nthe exception to some of the substantive provisions of the Charter<\/em> that\nare rights-bearing. That is why it does not allow for exception from\ninterpretive provisions such as section 28. This of course applies to section\n24, the remedies section, which by definition does not contain substantive,\nrights-bearing provisions. There is therefore nothing surprising, nor is there a\nmine of hidden arguments, in the fact that no reference to section 24 is\nincluded in the provisions of section 33, among those to sections from which\nthe latter allows Parliament and legislatures to derogate. For the foregoing\nreasons, there can be no judicial remedy (or judicial declaration, if one\nwishes to play with words) for the \u201cviolation\u201d of a validly suspended right,\neven if only temporarily and only in respect of provisions against which it is\nsought to be invoked. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

Let us do the \u201cthought experiment\u201d with subsection 24(2). Would the\ncourts have the power to exclude evidence obtained in (non-)\u201cviolation\u201d of Charter<\/em>\nrights from which applicable statutory provisions would validly be excepted\nfrom? Of course not. Certainly, in administrative law, the mere legality of the\nstate\u2019s action does not exclude the possibility that the state may be liable in\ntort law. Still, there must be a \u201cfault\u201d (in civil law) or some \u201cbreach of duty\u201d\n(in common law). In Canadian law, the possibility of state liability for the\nenactment of unconstitutional<\/em> legislation is extremely limited and\nrequires proof of negligence, bad faith or wilful blindness, a requirement that\nthe Supreme Court has confirmed applies to a claim under section 24(1) of the Canadian<\/em>\nCharter<\/em>.[24]<\/a> In the circumstances, let us remember that the\nissue before us concerns provisions that are not unconstitutional, but constitutionally\nvalid. In other words, we are relying on our reader to see the a fortiori<\/em>\nargument.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Conclusion<\/h4>\n\n\n\n

Finally, if there is one issue that should be considered\nnon-justiciable,[25]<\/a> as a purely political issue that does not\nraise a real question of positive law but rather that of the appropriateness of\nlegislative provisions, it is that of the \u201cconsistency\u201d of such provisions with\nprovisions of the constitutional Charter<\/em> from which they validly\nderogate.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

In conclusion, it is in our view that the last thing the rule of law and\njudicial review of legislation need is in fact judges who allow themselves to\nmake statements about the relationship of legal provisions to constitutional\nrights from which they are expressly and validly excepted, by virtue of an\nequally express authorization by the constituent, whose intention was to allow\nlegislators to shield certain issues from judicial debate altogether. In his short\nsolo article on this issue, Dean Leckey appeals to the moral \u201cresponsibility\u201d\nof jurists in a \u201ctragic\u201d situation.[26]<\/a> In sum, if we understand correctly, a\nresponsible jurist must agree with him. In this case, we regret to say that,\nwith all due respect, we think exactly the opposite.
<\/p>\n\n\n\n

\n\n\n\n

[1]<\/a> Momcilovic v The Queen<\/em>,\n[2011] HCA 34.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

[2]<\/a> Attorney-General v Taylor<\/em>,\n[2018] NZSC 104 [Taylor<\/em>].<\/p>\n\n\n\n

[3]<\/a> See eg Janet L Hiebert, \u201cThe Human Rights Act:\nAmbiguity about Parliamentary Sovereignty\u201d (2013) 14:12 German L J 2253;\nStephen Gardbaum, The New Commonwealth Model of Constitutionalism<\/em>\n(Cambrdge: Cambridge University Press, 2013); Nicholas W Barber, \u201cThe Afterlife\nof Parliamentary Sovereignty\u201d (2011) 9:1 Intl J Const L 144; Peter Oliver,\n\u201cSovereignty in the Twenty-First Century\u201d (2003) 14:2 King\u2019s College LJ 137;\nMark Elliot, \u201cParliamentary Sovereignty and the New Constitutional Order:\nLegislative Freedom, Political Reality and Convention\u201d (2002) 22:3 LS 340.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

[4]<\/a> Adrienne Stone accurately summarized in these\nwords: \u201cAs is well known, the Australian [legal and supra-legislative]\nConstitution is principally structural and federal in its scope and contains\nsparse, if any, rights protection, reflecting a marked preference for political\nconstitutionalism in that domain.\u201d See Adrienne Stone, \u201cProportionality and the\nBoundaries of Borrowing\u201d (24 April 2018) for I-CONnect Symposium on\n\u201cConstitutional Boundaries\u201d<\/em> on Int\u2019l J Const L Blog, online: <http:\/\/www.iconnectblog.com\/2018\/04\/i-connect-symposium-on-constitutional-boundaries-proportionality-and-the-boundaries-of-borrowing<\/a>>. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

[5]<\/a> Maxime St-Hilaire, \u201c\u2018Quasi Constitutional\u2019\nStatus as *Not* Implying a Form Requirement\u201d (8 August 2017) Int\u2019l J Const L\nBlog, online: <http:\/\/www.iconnectblog.com\/2017\/08\/quasi-constitutional-status-as-not-implying-a-form-requirement<\/a>>. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

[6]<\/a> See Taylor<\/em>, supra<\/em> note 28 at para 29. Without in any way making our argument dependent on a\nrebuttal of the merits of this decision, we would like to mention in passing\nthat we share Paul Daly\u2019s view that in this case, \u201cto the argument that issuing\na declaration would be entirely academic, in a context in which the meaning and\neffect of the ban on prisoner voting was uncontested, the majority offered a\ncomparatively weak set of ripostes\u201d in Paul Daly, \u201cThe Onward March of\nDeclaratory Relief?\u201d (12 November 2018) Administrative Law Matters<\/em>,\nonline: <https:\/\/www.administrativelawmatters.com\/blog\/2018\/11\/12\/the-onward-march-of-declaratory-relief\/<\/a>>. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

[7]<\/a> Jeremy Waldron, \u201cThe Core of the Case against\nJudicial Review\u201d (2006) Yale LJ 1346.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

[8]<\/a> See L\u00e9onid Sirota, \u201cChekhov\u2019s Gun\u201d (10 May\n2017) Double Aspect<\/em>, online : <https:\/\/doubleaspect.blog\/2017\/05\/10\/chekhovs-gun\/<\/a>>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

[9]<\/a> Ford<\/em>, supra<\/em> note\n3 at paras 65\u201366.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

[10]<\/a> Edwin Borchard, Declaratory Judgments<\/em>,\n2nd<\/sup> ed (Cleveland: Banks-Baldwin, 1941).<\/p>\n\n\n\n

[11]<\/a> Albert Venn Dicey, The Law of the Constitution<\/em>,\nvol 1, ed. J.W.F. Allison (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013) at 117.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

[12]<\/a> See Clough v Ratcliffe<\/em> (1847), 63 ER 1016 at 1023. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

[13]<\/a> See Dyson v Attorney-General (No. 1)<\/em>, [1911] 1 KB 410 at 421.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

[14]<\/a> Borchard, supra <\/em>note 36 at 299.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

[15]<\/a> Kourtessis v M.N.R<\/em>.,\n[1993] 2 SCR 53 at 495\u201398.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

[16]<\/a> Re: Resolution to amend the Constitution<\/em>, [1981] 1 SCR 753.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

[17]<\/a> For a complete list of this allocation, see\nMaxime St-Hilaire, \u201c150 Years On: Why don\u2019t we get clear on where the Canadian\nfederal distribution of legislative powers (legally) comes from?\u201d (24 August 2017) \u00c0 qui de droit<\/em>, online: <https:\/\/blogueaquidedroit.ca\/2017\/08\/24\/150-years-on-why-not-get-clear-on-where-the-canadian-federal-distribution-of-legislative-powers-comes-from\/<\/a>>.\n<\/p>\n\n\n\n

[18]<\/a> See Khadr<\/em>, supra<\/em> note 4.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

[19]<\/a> See Manitoba Metis Federation<\/em>, supra<\/em>\nnote 22; Ewert<\/em>, supra<\/em> note 24.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

[20]<\/a> Ewert<\/em>, supra<\/em>\nnote 24 at para 81.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

[21]<\/a> Solosky v The Queen<\/em>,\n[1980] 1 SCR 821 at 832.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

[22]<\/a> Operation Dismantle v The Queen<\/em>, [1985] 1 SCR 441 at para 36.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

[23]<\/a> Maxime St-Hilaire, \u201cL\u2019article 28 de la Charte canadienne des droits et\nlibert\u00e9s: des dispositions interpr\u00e9tatives sujettes \u00e0 interpr\u00e9tation\u201d (4\nFebruary 2020) Double Aspect<\/em>, online : <https:\/\/doubleaspect.blog\/2020\/02\/04\/25293\/<\/a>><\/p>\n\n\n\n

[24]<\/a> Mackin v New Brunswick (Minister of Finance); Rice v New Brunswick<\/em>, 2002 SCC 13 at para 79, [2002] 1 SCR 405.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

[25]<\/a> See Lorne M Sossin, Boundaries of Judicial\nReview<\/em>, (Toronto: Carswell, 2012) at 185\u2013216, where, in our opinion, should\nhave appeared the thesis defended here.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

[26]<\/a> Leckey, supra<\/em> note 10, at 1\u20132.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

This\u00a0is\u00a0the\u00a0second\u00a0of\u00a0a\u00a0two-part\u00a0essay\u00a0written\u00a0by\u00a0Professor\u00a0Maxime St-Hilaire and Xavier Foccroulle M\u00e9nard. Part I can be read here. Assessment of the Fourth Argument on British, Australian and New Zealand Law While not convincing, we find the comparative argument to have more weight, and this despite the following clarification. Gr\u00e9goire Webber, Eric Mendelshon and Robert Leckey give two examples taken from Australian …<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":13486,"featured_media":2356,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"_exactmetrics_skip_tracking":false,"_exactmetrics_sitenote_active":false,"_exactmetrics_sitenote_note":"","_exactmetrics_sitenote_category":0,"_monsterinsights_skip_tracking":false,"_monsterinsights_sitenote_active":false,"_monsterinsights_sitenote_note":"","_monsterinsights_sitenote_category":0,"footnotes":""},"categories":[36,34],"tags":[107,255,531,533,345,532],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.ruleoflaw.ca\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/3336"}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.ruleoflaw.ca\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.ruleoflaw.ca\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.ruleoflaw.ca\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/13486"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.ruleoflaw.ca\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=3336"}],"version-history":[{"count":1,"href":"https:\/\/www.ruleoflaw.ca\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/3336\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":3337,"href":"https:\/\/www.ruleoflaw.ca\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/3336\/revisions\/3337"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.ruleoflaw.ca\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/2356"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.ruleoflaw.ca\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=3336"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.ruleoflaw.ca\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=3336"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.ruleoflaw.ca\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=3336"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}